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WE HAVE SEEN that the economic aspects of pensions are as broad
as the flows of income, consumption and saving, and the network of
public and private arrangements which characterize an urban in-
dustrial society. We have reviewed the creation and development of
a mammoth pension structure and have attempted to preview its
future growth and progress in attaining maturity. In the process of
looking at these several segments of the whole, we have been at
pains to remind the reader that pensions. are not a separate structure
but a part of the warp and woof of the fabric of our economy. The
purpose of this chapter is to reflect briefly on some of the implica-
tions of this study of economic aspects of public and private
pensions.
IMPLICATIONS FOR SAVING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
The social security and other pension programs of the federal gov-
ernment, we have seen, act to sustain consumption and to depress
the ability of individuals to save. The present system of payroll taxes
to finance the OASDI system is less powerful in this direction than
the financing of noncontributory programs through general reve-
nues. It is simply not possible to lift living standards of the aged
without the redistribution of income which these and other fiscal
activities involve. The size and especially the prospective growth of.
these redistributive arrangements should, however, be taken into
account in any appraisal of the influence of the total federal tax
structure on economic growth.Concluding Observations 117
The pension plans covering employees of state and local govern-
ments and individuals in private employment, to the extent that they
are systematically funded, generate saving which is substantially a
net addition to total saving in the economy. This is especially
significant because the saving permits investment in business capital
and housing. The flow of funds to finance business plant and equip-
ment, inventories, research and development, and trade credit plays
an increasing role in enlarging and improving the efficiency of
productive capacity.
On the basis of our projections, the net flows into the markets for
corporate securities and mortgages from both state and local gov-
ernment and private pension plans will increase from $10.4 billion
a year in 1965 to more than $12 billion by 1975 and over $14
billion by 1980. These figures for net flows ignore the funds also
provided in the form of corporate retained earnings of portfolio
equity securities. To that extent, the projections represent an under-
statement of the volume of business capital financed. In any event,
unless there is a major change in the trends presently indicated, it is
clear that while these funds will finance a growing amount, they will
contribute a diminishing share to the growth of capital assets in the
business sector. This may or may not be disturbing to our expecta-
tions for economic growth, depending upon how we anticipate
developments in other influences on the saving and investment
process.
The projections, of course, are only an expression of the probable
net effects of many influences. The realization of substantially
higher returns can depress the level of contributions and of pension
savings. An acceleration in the pace of the extension of coverage, in
the trend toward more liberal vesting provisions, and in the rate of
funding can continue to increase the rate of pension saving for
another span of years. Our analysis of the working of the pension.
structure is, therefore, more illustrative than predictive.
Our exploration of the question of the burdensomeness of pen-
sion arrangements suggests that there is no precisely determinable
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level of what the economy can afford without sacrificing some of its
vitality and potential for growth. The size of the net burden attrib-
utable to the structure of benefit programs is apparently not great,
especially if the plans for employees o.f state and local governments
and private organizations continue to carry an important share of
the provision of benefits.
The need for improved data and techniques for the measurement
of the gain-loss patterns involved in huge transfers of income has
been demonstrated by our analysis. The fruitfulness of further
investigation and research in this area is evident for the informed
evaluation of the economic consequences of alternative courses of
action.
To set tax-supported pension programs apart from all of the
other fiscal operations of government and to attempt to assess their
influence on incentives and productivity gains is to create an arti-
ficial and unreal framework of analysis. Rather, the issue of what
we can afford in the way of old-age income provision must be
considered together with the whole range of public policies which
affect the returns to different factors of production. Indeed, the
interrelation between these and other public welfare objectives must
be examined and constantly re-examined in a changing economic
environment.1 It is idle to appraise the influence of pension commit-
ments running far into the future apart from the whole range of
commitments being made in other areas. What we can afford, in
some meaningful sense, is the total share of real output that can be
diverted from the factors of production which proyide it without
impairing the incentives and motivations for continued expansion
and growth.
IMPLICATIONS FOR EcoNoMIc STABILITY
Pension and disability benefits clearly operate as contracyclical
influences in the direction of economic stability. Retirements tend
1Seethis writer's "The Future of Private Pensions: Some Economic Aspects,"
Journal of Risk and insurance, March 1967, pp. 27—32.Concluding Observations 119
to increase when employment opportunities wane. The level of
contributions, especially in private plans for the funding of past
service liabilities and in profit-sharing plans, is sensitive to changes
in corporate profits. Income maintenance is aided by rising benefits
in periods of slack employment, and pension saving declines
slightly in periods of less active demand for business capital in-
vestment.
In any case, the regularity of benefit payments is another of the
built-in stabilizers in the economy.2 Public and private pension
programs will continue to provide a growing share of the income
payments not susceptible to cyclical variations in aggregate eco-
nomic activity.
The question has been raised as to whether pension saving is not
too stable in times of deficient aggregate demand for consumer
goods and services. As a consequence, it is argued, the cyclical
changes in saving rates which contribute to stability are muted by
the regularity of pension saving.3 One answer is that the limits on the
variability of pension saving are not entirely indigenous to the
pension structure. In the case of private plans, indeed, corporate
managements have preferred to use variable contributions as a
method of averaging income. Public regulation to assure the fulfill-
ment of pension promises seeks to regularize contributions and so
does the Internal Revenue Code. Financial analysts and the public
accounting profession seek regular recognition of pension costs as
they are incurred and not when flexible contributions are actually
made to the fund.4 Also, variability in employer contributions is not
feasibleunderthebudgetingpracticesofstateandlocal
governments.
Essentially, however, the reality is that pension systems are not
well designed to provide variability in saving flows. The long-term
2 Cf. Arthur F.Burns, "Progress Towards Economic Stability," American
Economic Review, March 1960.
Nelson D. McClung, Old Age Income Assurance: An Outline of Issues and
Alternatives, U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, November 1966,p. 18.
Ernest L. Hicks, Accounting for the Cost of Pension Plans, Accounting Re-
search Study No. 8, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1965.120 Economic Aspects of Pension!s
nature of their contracts calls for regularity in provisions to meet
them. Finally, equity investment is a major outlet for the saving
flow, and there is some presumption that rates of return will prove
higher on investments made during periods of slack economic activ-
ity. The stabilizing influence of pension fund investing on the sec-
ondary market for equity securities would diminish if pension sav-
ing flows were permitted to be highly variable.
One of the most important aspects of economic stability is the
question of inflation. We have repeatedly observed that inflation
can erode the value of pension promises and warned that, unless the
burden of income transfers is willingly borne by the working mem-
bers of society, they will acquiesce in policies which lighten the
burden by inflation. This unfortunate outcome of the pension move-
ment is not now in sight. But neither has the full burden been felt.
The volume of claims to be presented has only well begun its long
rise. Capital formation at a high level has spurred real output.
Pension saving in the future may contribute less to this progress if,
in fact, saving is the limiting factor on economic growth.
As we move into the period of substantial rise in benefit pay-
ments and witness the diminishing pace of pension saving, it will be
necessary to adjust fiscal policy to the changing situation. Again,
the availability of more precise measures of possible future effects of
income redistribution through pension programs will be required to
judge the adjustments most appropriate to the emerging situation.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CAPITAL MARKETS
The stability of net fund flows makes pension systems almost unique
among the major suppliers of funds to the capital markets. Apart
from the mild cyclical fluctuations mentioned above, no unpredicta-
ble changes in inflows need be anticipated by the portfolio manager.
Another unique characteristic is the absence of valuation problems.
There is no requirement, as with a deposit-type financial institution
or a life insurance con pany, to demonstrate on a certain day anConcluding Observations 121
excess of assets over liabilities on the basis of some prescribed or
conventional valuation of assets.
These two salient characteristics, the absence of both liquidity
and published statement requirements, impart different dimensions
to the portfolio management decision to be made in relation to the
long-time horizon of pension commitments. Despite competitive
pressures to show good performance, the outcome of decisions is
still to be judged over an extended period of time. If the illiquidity
of a financial asset carries a premium in yield, pension funds are in
about the best position to capture it. Hence the evolution of portfo-
lio management has been steadily in the direction of holding less
liquidassets,even instate and local government retirement
systems.
The stability of lending and investing in the capital market ob-
scures some variability in the pace of forward commitments for
directly placed corporate obligations and mortgage loans. The tend-
ency to enlarge forward commitments in periods of strong demand
for funds may have the effect of contributing to a situation in which
idle balances are being activated and velocity is rising. However,
there can be no important shift into claims on pension funds and
pension fund managers have little capacity or inclination to supply
liquid assets, such as government securities, to holders of idle bal-
ances.5 The important role of these funds, therefore, is as a rather
neutral financial intermediary between savers and investors, with
little impact on income velocity or the money markets.
We have observed that both state and local government and
private plans, as suppliers of loanable funds, have shown a strong
preference for' corporate securities. Our projections for the future
show a continuation of the growth of participation in the area of
real estate finance. Slow but steady progress has been made in
For a full discussion of these points, see Victor L. Andrews, "Noninsured
Corporate and State and Local Government Retirement Funds in the Financial
Structure," Private Capital Markets, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964, especially pp.
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solving the administrative, and expense problems of handling mort-
gages. It is now possible for a pension fund to secure most of the
services normally encompassed in home-office administration from
organizations which economically perform these functions. A mort-
gage portfolio can be handled with almost the ease and economy of
a bond portfolio. If net yields after allocated expenses are competi-
tive, risk factors considered, there will undoubtedly be a substantial
grOwth in pension fund mortgage lending across the nation in con-
ventional as well as FHA-insured and VA-guaranteed loans. By the
late 1970's, the volume could easily be comparable to the average
net acquisitions of mutual savings banks in recent years.
The ownership of real estate equities would appear to be a natu-
ral avenue of investment. Sale and leaseback financing has been, in
fact, a growing outlet. The tax-exempt status of a private pension
plan, however, can be impaired by engaging in an unrelated busi-
ness. The operation of income-producing property, especially if the
purchase is financed with borrowed funds and only an equity posi-
tion is retained, is susceptible to being considered such an unrelated
business. The tax benefits from accelerated depreciation to a real
estate operator, and his ability to introduce substantial financial
leverage, usually justify his paying a higher price for property than
a pension fund is prepared to pay without these possibilities. Hence,
pension fund ownership of true real estate equities is not likely to
grow rapidly in the years ahead.
Corporate equity securities, we have seen, are likely to continue
to occupy a major position in privately organized pension programs
and to become increasingly important in state and local government
retirement systems. Common stocks have historically produced a
higher total yield than bonds or mortgages for the holder in a
position to accept price volatility and irregularity in the realization
of long-term rates of return. Pension funds are particularly well
situated to accept these disadvantages of corporate equity securities.
The principal limitation on their role is the need to support guaran-
teed annuity contracts and the problems with stocks as an invest-Concluding Observations 123
ment medium for employee contributions subject to withdrawal and
borrowing privileges.
In the accumulation of pension fund assets for the provision of
future benefits of indeterminate amount, common stocks have espe-
cially desirable characteristics. The recent changes in life insurance
operations to provide for separate accounts for corporate stocks
should stimulate the rate of accumulation over the immediate fu-
ture. Whether the benefits of equity investment will be more widely
shared with present and future pensioners by use of the variable
annuity contract is less certain. The fifteen-year record of the Col-
lege Retirement Equities Fund in providing variable benefits for
educators is persuasive of the. merits of this approach, but many
employee groups are not anxious to trade off the certainty and
stability of retirement income for the possibility of a materially
higher but fluctuating average level of benefits. There are also
communication problems involved, and CREF's experience may
not be readily transferable to other situations. Nevertheless, a trend
toward the greater use of variable annuity arrangements is the most
important single factor which might affect our projected capital
market flows.
Our projections show modest purchases of U.S. government se-
curities at some point in the future and an early cessation of net
liquidation. This reflects the assumption that in the course of an
orderly approach to public debt management the 4¼ per cent inter-
est rate ceiling on long-term bonds will be removed and that the
Treasury will find occasions to offer securities which are attractive
in comparison with alternative investments in terms of yield, free-
dom from an early call provision, and marketability. There is al-
ways room for marketable securities, especially as the concentration
in direct placements, mortgages, and common stocks limits flexibil-
ity in portfolio management at times.
Fund management has been criticized both for being too cautious
and for accepting too great risks.6 Equating the proportion in com-
6See, for example, OldAgeIncome Assurance, pp. 19—20.0
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mon stocks with high risk ignores what we know of the role of
diversification—i.e., the right combination of high-risk equities,
with a minimum of covariance between them, can comprise a port-
folio with very limited risk. The investment of pension funds in
unseasoned, marginal enterprises, on the other hand, clearly raises
questions as to whether the trustees are observing the long-estab-
lishedstandards of the prudent-man rule.
There has not been any visible pattern of relating the aversion to
risk in the pension fund portfolio to the risk characteristics asso-
ciated with the enterprises which contribute to it. If there were, we
should expect to find the highest acceptance of risk among pension
funds for state and local government employees or public utilities.
Conversely, the greatest aversion to risk should be characteristic of
plans for employees in highly cyclical or chronically unstable activi-
ties. Actually, almost the reverse is true. This may be a result of
transferring to fund investment management decision-making the
attitudes and outlook most frequently applied to the organization's
internal investment decision-making.
Generalizations about the cautiousness of fund managements
are, therefore, difficult to make. All kinds of portfolio policies are
emerging and being followed. The spectrum of policies is nearly as
broad as the range of investment opportunities. Over time, the
funds will flow to the areas of the best returns, the allowance for
risk being taken into account not perfectly but at least rationally.
Within the framework of recognized standards of fiduciary re-
sponsibility, then, the flow of pension saving will continue to spread
through most segments of the capital markets. It is not material if
these funds acquire predominantly seasoned equity securities, for
example, because those who sell to pension funds may be in a
position to reinvest in companies with greater risk exposure. In an
aggregate flow-of-funds view of the capital markets, the significant
factors are aggregate sources and uses, the absence of compartmen-
talization of markets, and a market structure which permits prompt
responses to changing demands.Concluding Observations 125
The growth of insured and noninsured pension plans for individ-
uals in private employment, because of their flexibility in the alloca-
tion of saving flows, has probably done more than any other single
development to improve the breadth and responsiveness of the
capital markets to changing patterns of demand. They provided a
major remedy to the shortage of equity capital in the period
immediately following World War II, as evidenced by the subse-
quent recovery in the value of corporate earning power to previous
levels. They have contributed to a closing of the yield differential
between directly placed and publicly offered corporate bonds in the
upper-quality ranges. They may have aided the responsiveness of
certain classes of mortgage yields to bond yields.7
The picture which emerges is of an additional source of funds for
the capital markets with a minimum of permanent commitments to
any particular sector of those markets. In the years ahead, we can
anticipate somewhat greater flexibility in the allocation of fund
flows and greater responsiveness to yield differentials which express
the comparative intensity of demands for funds. Our projections are
illustrative of possible patterns of response, but what actually takes
place will be a function of the changing pressures in the market
place. On balance, these public and private pension accumulations
have made a major contribution to the efficienôy of the capital
markets in channeling funds to the most productive areas of
investments.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
The increasing readiness of noninsured private pension trusts and
state and local government retirement systems to participate in the
mortgage market on a much larger scale suggests that life insurance
companies, savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks,
and commercial banks will find new competition for loans. Some of
More definitive conclusions on these points will emerge from the National
Bureau's interest rate study. See Joseph W. Conard, TheBehaviorof Interest
Rates: A Progress Report, New York, NBER, 1966.126 Economic Aspects of Pensions
these institutions have already been working to establish relation-
ships and to provide essential services to fund administrators. Mort-
gage bankers are also active in tailoring their facilities to these new
markets. Such arrangements and correspondent services will un-
doubtedly develop further.
Efforts to develop a secondary market for mortgages seem un-
likely to engage the interest of pension fund portfolio managers.
The possibility of resale is well down on the list of desired objec-
tives. Greater uniformity of mortgage terms and characteristics
would, however, be an attractive feature of mortgage market
developments.
Unless there is a major change in the saving habits and motiva-
tion observed in our study, other financial institutions will have
good markets for financial services which either supplement or
complement pension saving. Mutual fund plan accounts, efficient
financing of household capital, additional life insurance protection,
and variable savings accounts are a few of the possible areas of
growth which may be stimulated by the extension of pension
coverage.
IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY
The Cabinet Committee appointed by President Kennedy chose as
the title of its report "Public Policy and Private Pension Programs."
Major sections of that report dealt with economic aspects of pension
growth and the public interest in private pensions. Although itis not
within our province to make or endorse policy recommendations,
certain of our findings are relevant to the Committee's analysis.
The Committee recognized that it is essential to the operation of
public and private pension programs that the highest standards of fi-
ducial responsibility be maintained. More complete disclosures of
portfolios and changes in them were recommended. Also, the Com-
mittee advocated strengthening statutory provisions for enforcing
recognized standards of fiducial responsibility in preference to theConcluding Observations 127
application of regulations or formulas which would reduce the
flexibility of asset management.
Our analysis of portfolio management indicates that diversity and
flexibility of investment decisions account for much of the contribu-
tions of these funds to the more efficient functioning of the capital
markets. At the same time, we have found no reason to conclude
that more complete disclosure to participants would hamper portfo-
lio management.
Another relevant issue of public policy is the question of con-
centration of economic and financial power. Limitations on the
purchase of employer securities in private funds have long been rec-
ognized on the grounds that collateralizing a promise with the promi-
sor's evidence of debt or a share in its equity is no security at all. At
the same time, this type of limitation seeks to prevent use of the
pension fund for purposes of control, support of the market for
employer securities, facilitating acquisitions or control of other
companies, and in other ways transforming the fund into an agency
for purposes other than its intended one, the funding of pension
commitments. In this report we have accepted the view that the
governing considerations in portfolio management decisions will be
comparative yield expectations and not the search for control or
opportunities to exert influence on portfolio companies.
Certain safeguards are already operative. The most important is
the established requirement that a trustee show undivided loyalty to
his trust. Conflicts of interest must be avoided. The record of life
insurance companies and bank trustees is excellent in this respect.
Economic pressures are equally powerful in the same direction.
Increasing emphasis on the quality of investment management to
reduce the cost of pension benefits has strengthened the competitive
forces at work. As large employers have divided their funds among
a number of bank trustees or placed different funds under the
management of different trustees, the measurement and appraisal of
results have emerged as a practical prohibition against any course
other than strict attention to the business of investing.128 Economic Aspects of Pensions
It is true, of course, that some very large concentrations of assets
are emerging, particularly in the case of state-administered public
employee retirement systems. Despite a few lapses from undivided
loyalty to their participants, public fund administrators also have an
excellent record of probity. Examinations in many cases by state
insurance departments reinforce the system of internal controls.
The trustees of these systems have their good names, and often
public office,at stake in the administration of the retirement
systems.
Admittedly, it is not feasible for a state retirement system to split
its assets among several trustees as industrial corporations have
frequently done. But concern is more properly with the lethargy and
lack of flexibility in asset management which may affect these large
pools of capital, especially when governmental units show reluc-
tance to employ qualified staffs to deal with financial management
responsibilities of these proportions.
Our study suggests,therefore,that competitive factors and
greater disclosure are exercising strong pressures against the abuse
of economic and financial power. It is clearly appropriate, however,
that these issues in the realm of public policy should be examined
and debated. In a relatively short span of years, public and private
efforts have brought major new financial institutions into being.
Mass coverage of the contingency of loss of income because of age
or disability has been extraordinarily successful and shows promise
of even further development. It is only prudent that we should take
stock of both the economic and public policy issues which emerge,
in this case, from the realization of accomplishments beyond our
expectations. We can only hope that this kind of review will take
place again and again, each time with better grounds for reaching
judgments. We can also expect that it will become common knowl-
edge that the validity of pension promises ultimately rests on the
capacity of our economy to grow in productivity and to achieve
higher standards of living for citizens of all ages.